Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy’s Legacy Revisited by Van Alstyne, William W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1986
Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy’s
Legacy Revisited
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy’s Legacy Revisited" (1986). Faculty Publications. 737.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/737
BOOK REVIEWS 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND FREE SPEECH: 
LEVY'S LEGACY" REVISITED 
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS. By Leonard W. Levy.1 New York: 
Oxford University Press. i985. Pp. xxii, 383. $29.95. 
Reviewed by William W. Van Alstyne2 
I. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
In the preface to Emergence of a Free Press, Leonard Levy tells 
a wonderful story of the book's original appearance twenty-six years 
ago, in I96o.3 In I957 the Fund for the Republic under Robert 
Hutchins commissioned Levy to write a memorandum on the original 
meaning of the first amendment's clauses. The twenty-five pages he 
produced on the free speech and free press clauses turned out sur- 
prisingly, to Levy as well as to the Fund. The conclusions did not 
vindicate the liberal optimism of the project's sponsors that these 
clauses were a triumph of early libertarianism. Accordingly, Levy 
reports, Hutchins "made it clear to me that the pamphlet [which the 
Fund meant to publish] would not include that section of the work" 
(p. viii). 
The Fund's effective censorship of Levy's work was unseemly and 
unwise. It misjudged the character of the man; it so angered Levy 
as to drive him to an academic's revenge. From what might have 
been a mere "but see" minor pamphlet citation against Zechariah 
Chafee's famous Free Speech in the United States, Levy's memoran- 
dum eventually became a tremendously controversial counterweight 
to Chafee's work. Enormously expanded and deepened in its research, 
the unprepossessing memorandum became Legacy of Suppression: 
Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History. Its principal 
conclusion, pugnaciously explicit in its title, was devastating.4 
Leonard Levy schooled the Fund for the Republic in the poet's 
claim that "Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again."5 Levy's fallen 
I Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities, Claremont College. 
2 Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
3 It then appeared as L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (I960). 
4 Chafee's principal conclusion was that the drafters and ratifiers of the first amendment 
intended "to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism 
of the government, without anv incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United 
States of America." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 2I (I941). Levy's 
principal conclusion was virtually the opposite. See L. LEVY, supra note 3, at 247-48. 
5 William Cullen Bryant, Thte Battle-field (I837), in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM 
CULLEN BRYANT I8i, I82 (I9I6). 
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bird, his original memorandum, had become a phoenix - a firebird 
of skeptical scholarship reborn in the ashes of foundational censorship. 
It was a deeply impressive work. Its principal thesis, delivered by a 
reluctant but resolute scholar, was that the first amendment did not 
renounce, but rather received, the full common law of seditious libel.6 
A quarter of a century has elapsed since Legacy of Suppression 
first appeared. Its author thought it needed revision, and sixty percent 
of Emergence of a Free Press is apparently new material (p. vii). In 
the preface to Emergence, Levy explains that his earlier work may 
have been somewhat overstated, partly from unconscious "indignation 
at Hutchins and the Fund for attempting to suppress my work" (p. 
ix). Further, Professor Levy makes clear that some of the material 
provided by scholars who were disturbed by his earlier work has 
contributed to some rethinking on his own part.7 Emergence, then, 
is Legacy revised - the mature scholar's more reflective ruminations 
on the origins of the free speech and free press clauses. 
How different is Emergence from Legacy? Not significantly in 
terms of substantive conclusions, despite the welcome addition of new 
material.8 Nor does Professor Levy say otherwise.9 Indeed, the single 
most critical conclusion that made Legacy dramatic and controversial 
in I960 is verbatim the same: 
If ... a choice must be made between two propositions, first, that 
the [freedom of speech and press] clause substantially embodied the 
6 Since the preparation of this book review, Professor Levy has published an article severely 
criticizing another author for a similar description of Legacy. See Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770 n.ii (I985). I am concerned lest Professor Levy also think he has 
been misconstrued here, despite efforts in the course of this review to supply the reader with 
quotations and references. Given the circumstances, I think it of more than ordinary importance 
to encourage the reader to read the work under review rather than to trust substitute descrip- 
tions. 
7 Legacy provoked a large number of reviews, many of which Levy cites in his preface to 
Emergence (p. xiv n.II). For two of the most recent and critical reviews, see Anderson, The 
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (I983); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the 
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 9I (I984). For Levy's response 
to Anderson, see Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. I77 (I984). 
For his response to Mayton, see Levy, supra note 6. 
In addition to the reviews, a number of scholarly books exploring particular aspects of speech 
and press history have appeared since Legacy, and Levy acknowledges these works in Emer- 
gence. Among the best of these books is E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
AMERICA (I963). For a most helpful earlier work, see F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN 
ENGLAND I476-I776 (I952). 
8 Although I had read Legacy three times, I read Emergence with little sense that it differed 
from Legacy in anything but the elaborate footnotes responding to reviews and criticisms of the 
original work. Only on going back over Emergence carefully could I see how sixty percent 
might be new. The figure is doubtless accurate, and I have no interest in suggesting otherwise. 
MN, point is that the main conclusions and general development are so similar to the original as 
to encourage the illusion that Emergence is a nearly identical work. 
9 "My principal thesis remains unchanged" (p. xii). 
I 986] BOOK RE VIEW 109I 
Blackstonian definition and left the law of seditious libel in force, or 
second, that it repudiated Blackstone and superseded the common 
law, the evidence points strongly in support of the former proposition. 
(P. 28I). 
On this central point, Levy has expanded the new edition principally 
to restate the original material, to enlarge upon it, and to defend it 
against its critics. The author has essentially not budged on the 
principal question. 
The primary change (which figures prominently in the retitling of 
the book) is a factual concession, which has little effect on Levy's 
main thesis. Levy acknowledges that, given his description of the 
prevailing state of the law, the original work may have implied that 
the early press in America was an intimidated and cowed collection 
of ineffective newspapers. He is now at pains to correct that mis- 
impression. Despite the received law of seditious libel, Levy notes, a 
robust and vituperative press thrived. Further research into the early 
history of newspapers in America confirmed that prosecutions of the 
press, although not infrequent, scarcely affected the onrush of derog- 
atory newsprint. Indeed, he acknowledges, a fractious American press 
developed as an influential fourth estate much earlier than one might 
have supposed - but it did so within the context of "a system char- 
acterized by legal fetters and the absence of a theory of political 
expression that justified those press practices" (p. xvii). Early press 
practices, Levy insists, thus had no immediate impact upon the sub- 
stantive law. Rather, it is Levy's point that such practices left the 
law substantially unaffected. Exactly as John Stuart Mill observed of 
English law in I858, the early American law remained servile to the 
rationale of state interest and thus remained available to governmental 
officials whenever the right occasion might demand.10 
The second notable modification from the original edition concerns 
the influence of the strict Blackstonian view of the free press on 
American common law practice and the first amendment. Black- 
stone's belief, one will recall, was that "the freedom of the press" 
consisted solely in exemption from licensing and some other forms of 
prior restraint. This view offered the press no shelter from subsequent 
criminal accountability for "mischievous" or "offensive" utterances or 
10 In the first paragraph of the chapter entitled "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion" 
in On Liberty, Mill wrote: 
Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it 
was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force 
against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrec- 
tion drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, 
in constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely 
responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, 
except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. 
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY I7 (D. Spitz ed. I975) (Ist ed. London I859) (footnotes omitted). 
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for statements "of a pernicious tendency," distressing to "government 
and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty."11 Under this 
view, Parliament's decision of I694 not to renew the infamous press 
licensing regime against which John Milton had inveighed a half- 
century earlierl2 marked the sole, allegedly ample boundary of pro- 
tection for a free press. Consistent with that position, four varieties 
of criminal libel were fully punishable in the common law courts: 
blasphemous, obscene, private, and seditious libel. In Emergence, 
Levy retreats somewhat from the stringency of his previous judgment 
that the framers adopted the Blackstonian view whole. Although he 
continues to maintain that the framers assumed that seditious libel - 
the most threatening of the common law forms - would survive the 
first amendment, he now suggests that some of the worst common 
law features of this kind of libel had already been partly discredited 
(pp. ix-xi ). 
At common law, prosecutions for seditious libel initially inhered 
in virtually any act that might estrange the people from their govern- 
ment - including accusations of governmental wrongdoing or corrup- 
tion. Most important, the truth of the statements critical of the gov- 
ernment was no defense. Indeed, at one point the Star Chamber went 
so far as to suggest that truth might be an aggravating factor of the 
crime, because a true statement regarding governmental misconduct 
might well pose more of a danger than an easily rebuttable false one. 
Additionally, even after the inquisitorial Star Chamber was abolished 
in I642 and the common law courts took up an expanded jurisdiction 
over seditious libel prosecutions,13 the role of the jury in those courts 
was extremely limited. For example, the presiding judge, and not the 
jury, determined whether the words used by the defendant possessed 
a seditious tendency and whether they were published with malice. 14 
The jury merely found whether the defendant was a publisher of the 
words and whether the words expressed or implied such innuendo as 
the prosecutor alleged would make them seditious as a matter of law. 
With the role of the jury so slight, and that of the crown-favoring 
judges so great, publishers were at enormous risk. 
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *I5I-52. 
12 See J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (R. Jeeb ed. I9I8) (Ist ed. London I644) ("[T]hough 
all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do 
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength."). Milton's views are critically 
reviewed in Emergence at pp. 93-97. Levy notes that Milton's essential thought had already 
been put forward thirty years earlier by Leonard Busher, an obscure Baptist layman (p. IOI). 
13 For a recent article suggesting that the demise of licensing led to expansive adaptations 
of seditious libel in the English courts, see Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious 
Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 66i, 7I4-25 (I985). 
14 The requirement of "malice," moreover, was in effect no requirement at all because judges 
routinely inferred malice from the mere nature of the defendant's statements. 
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In Emergence, however, Levy notes that by the time Congress 
considered the Bill of Rights in I789, both legal practice and legal 
theory in the United States had undergone some degree of change. 
Juries were permitted a larger role and, indeed, jury nullification 
practices sometimes saved publishers who doubtless would have been 
convicted in a bench trial. Some jurisdictions also acknowledged the 
defense of truth. Accordingly, Levy notes that the freedom of speech 
and of the press defined by the first amendment may have absorbed 
these new limitations upon the law of seditious libel.15 Indeed, the 
major congressional action bearing on freedom of the press in the 
early years of the republic, the Sedition Act of I798, was quite in 
accord with these developments.16 
But in this slightly softened form - that is, softened from the 
original position in Legacy - Levy still concludes that the first amend- 
ment was adopted to co-exist with the common law legacy of seditious 
libel and did not represent its repudiation. Thus, although much more 
elaborate than Legacy, Emergence fundamentally reaffirms that work's 
skeptical first amendment thesis. At least it appears to do so when 
judged by the author's own expressed assessment of the times.17 
Yet it is not clear to me that the whole of the book really supports 
this thesis. Some of the parts of Emergence are not altogether well 
accounted for in what we have thus far reviewed. Indeed, the sum 
of the work's parts is in many ways extremely different; it frankly 
does not support the existence of a wide-ranging power in Congress 
to regulate speech and the press. To the contrary, it suggests a 
decision on the part of the framers that Congress would have nothing 
to say in determining the latitude of speech or press in the United 
States. Thus, in significant respects Emergence provides a thesis set 
against itself - a thesis at odds with a weak view of the first amend- 
ment. To see how this may be so, we need to begin again. 
1 Levy terms these limitations "Zengerian principles" (p. 2I9), a nice turn of phrase that 
pays tribute to the impact of the jury's decision to acquit Peter Zenger in I735, despite apparently 
incontrovertible evidence and a straightforward instruction from the judge concerning the ap- 
plicable law of seditious libel. The case is well presented at pp. 37-44. 
It should be noted, however, that Professor Levy retains some doubts about whether the 
first amendment incorporated these changes in the common law of seditious libel (pp. 274-77). 
The reason for his uncertainty lies in the words of the first amendment; the amendment applies 
to "Congress," but not necessarily to judge-made federal common law. 
16 Levy suggests that the Sedition Act "incorporated everything that the libertarians had 
demanded: a requirement that criminal intent be shown; the power of the jury to decide whether 
the accused's statement was libelous as a matter of law as well as of fact; and truth as a defense, 
an innovation not accepted in England until I843" (p. 297). 
17 "The thought and experience of a lifetime, indeed the taught traditions of law and politics 
extending back many generations, supplied an a priori belief that freedom of political discourse, 
however broadly conceived, stopped short of seditious libel" (p. 269). 
I094 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:I089 
II. SECOND IMPRESSIONS 
Laying Leonard Levy's book aside for a moment, I suppose it is 
true that, roughly speaking, there are two broad categories of theses 
about the relationship between the law of seditious libel and the 
framing of the first amendment. Within the first category are claims 
that the two subjects are directly connected - that the law of seditious 
libel figured prominently in the framing of the first amendment and 
that one of the amendment's principal objects was to settle whether 
seditious libel could be used as an instrument of national power. 
Within the second category, no such resolving claim is made. Rather, 
the claim is that the two subjects are only indirectly related, although 
related nonetheless. Under the latter supposition, the framers of the 
first amendment were not principally concerned with seditious libel, 
yet their determinations as set forth in the amendment have certain 
logical consequences with respect to a large number of subjects, in- 
cluding (but not limited to) seditious libel. 
Based on first impressions, Leonard Levy's book might seem to 
support a thesis that would fall in the first category. Indeed, that is 
surely why Legacy initially provoked such a large number of deeply 
critical reviews -reviews dismayed by the thought that the crabbed 
Blackstonian view of a free press was congenial to the framers and 
was therefore preserved among the powers of Congress in the framing 
of the first amendment. 
In the beginning of Emergence, Levy takes care to state that this 
is not in fact his contention. He sets before himself a much more 
limited task: the critical reexamination of the assertive affirmative 
thesis that "in both law and history ... it was the intent of the 
American Revolution or the Framers of the First Amendment to 
abolish the common law of seditious libel" (p. xii). That thesis is, of 
course, a "category one" kind of thesis - it asserts (or assumes) that 
the subject of seditious libel figured prominently in the framing of the 
first amendment and attempts to establish that the object of the 
amendment was to repudiate the common law legacy. In Emergence, 
Levy makes an extremely solid case that this thesis claims too much 
- that the "category one" libertarian claim is subject "to the Scottish 
verdict: not proven" (p. 269). 
In the course of discharging what was at first a very limited 
burden, however, Levy seems to go far toward adopting the opposite 
view - that the framers of the first amendment intended to concede 
to Congress the power to enact legislation directed against the forms 
of speech included within the common law definition of seditious libel. 
At the end of Emergence, Levy - whose personal preference is for a 
first amendment worthy of some distinction - makes a suggestion 
that he thinks will save the amendment, but that itself implies the 
amendment meant to favor Congress. "What [the framers] said," Levy 
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writes, "is far more important than what they meant. It is enough 
that they gave constitutional recognition to the principle of freedom 
of speech and press in unqualified and undefined terms" (p. 349). This 
advice is in fact very heavy, for it plainly asserts that there is a 
disparity between what the framers meant and what they said. Here, 
then, in the ultimate and penultimate sentences of his work, Levy 
tends to confirm his critics' description of what Leonard Levy thinks 
history really shows: that the relationship between seditious libel and 
the first amendment is indeed a "category one" kind of relationship, 
but that the framers of our first amendment meant to grant (rather 
than to deny) Congress a broad power to enact repressive legislation. 
Perhaps that negative thesis is correct, but taken as an original 
thesis, with its own burden to carry, there is much reason to doubt 
it. 18 In fact, little evidence sustains it as an affirmative brief, and a 
great deal supports the view that it is false. What is more, Professor 
Levy himself furnishes much of the best evidence that it is false. It 
is for this reason that his book is more complicated than it first appears 
to be and, indeed, is a book that in some measure undermines its 
own thesis. 
Leaning strongly against any claim of substantial power in Con- 
gress over the press are, first of all, the disclaimers of leading Fed- 
eralists. As Levy himself observes, even such noted Federalists as 
James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton generally denied the very 
possibility of national legislation regulating the press. The new na- 
18 There is good reason to be concerned with this question, because Professor Levy's sug- 
gestion for rescuing the first amendment from its history by relying upon what the framers said 
(as distinct from what they meant) may not be sustainable. 
Like a number of other modern writers, Levy presumes to describe the first amendment as 
an amendment that grants constitutional recognition to "the principle" of free speech. Like some 
other writers also, he says the framers "gave constitutional recognition to the principle of free 
speech . . . in unqualified . . . terms" (p. 349) (emphasis added). Looking solely to what the 
framers said (and laying aside all evidence of what they may have meant), the first amendment 
provides no firm support for either of these suggestions. The first suggestion begs its own 
question respecting what principle the framers recognized in the amendment. The second 
suggestion must struggle against the text of the first amendment itself. 
What the framers said is merely that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech or of the press." Who says these words "recognize" a "principle"? What principle is 
it? The amendment does not speak to the issue at all. It is utterly uninstructive on that point. 
The assertion mav be correct or it may be incorrect; nothing on the face of the amendment 
makes the one possibility more likely than the other. The appeal to "the principle" thus 
"recognized" is entirely circular. 
The second assertion - that the first amendment speaks in "unqualified" terms - is most 
puzzling. Such freedom of speech and of the press as may be protected is not described by the 
first amendment in unqualified terms; rather it is described in circumscribing terms. "[T]he" 
freedom of speech (whatever that mav be) is protected, nothing more. The locution of the first 
amendment is thus not the locution of unqualified terms. Rather, the amendment seems to say 
that a certain freedom of speech ("the" freedom) is protected and that in regard to all else, 
Congress may do what it will. 
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tional government, Wilson declared, would have "'no power whatso- 
ever"' concerning the press (p. 270).19 And "'why declare that things 
shall not be done,"' Hamilton wrote, "'which there is no power to 
do?"' (p. 270). Indeed, Levy notes that "[o]nly after the new gov- 
ernment had gone into operation and after the ratification of the First 
Amendment did many of the Framers and their associates begin to 
speak and act as if freedom of speech and press could be prosecuted 
in federal courts and be abridged by Congress as well" (p. 274) (em- 
phasis added). The material scarcely supports the view that the fra- 
mers intended to give Congress wide-ranging power to adopt the kind 
of legislation that the Sedition Act of I798 represents. 
As Levy notes, it was only the Sedition Act of I798 that stimulated 
self-serving Federalist claims of congressional power over the press. 
He is surely correct in noting that the factional politics of the Act 
make it an "unreliable" (p. 282) and "untrustworthy" (p. 279) source 
of first amendment insight. And insofar as its debates do reveal 
anything about the intention of the framers, it is noteworthy that 
"[e]very Democratic-Republican with the possible exception of James 
Sullivan believed it to be unconstitutional" (p. 280). Included within 
this substantial group of opponents was James Madison, the principal 
author of the first amendment. In Levy's own opinion, Madison was 
"the most influential of all the Framers" and was "possibly the one 
person of outstanding distinction whose record [was] clean and con- 
sistent" (p. 28I). What, then, was Madison's view? As Levy reports 
it, Madison's view was that the first amendment flatly forbade the 
enactment of a national sedition act. Indeed, "[t]he amendment, Mad- 
ison declared, was intended to have the broadest construction on 
freedom of the press as well as religion. It 'meant a positive denial 
to Congress of any power whatever on the subject"' (p. 3I8). 
What does this material prove? Does it prove that in fact there 
was a robust libertarian repugnance to everything even mildly akin 
to seditious libel (and thus that the Chafee thesis may be correct after 
all)? In context, the material does not prove this thesis because it 
says nothing about the extent to which the several states might enact 
or otherwise proceed in accordance with seditious libel law. The 
evidence does indicate, however, a deep distrust of Congress and a 
19 Wilson, Levy notes, attempted at other times to rely on an extraconstitutional body of 
continuing federal criminal common law. As to' that claim, however, Levy himself concludes 
that "the evidence is contradictory" (p. 275), and the Supreme Court rejected the general notion 
the first time it came up on review, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 
32 (I8I2). 
20 Further support can be found in James Madison's account of the constitutional convention. 
On Friday, Sept. I4, I787, in convention, "Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Gerry, moved to insert a 
declaration 'that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed.' Mr. Sherman. It is 
unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the Press." J. MADISON, NOTES OF 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF I787, at 640 (A. Koch ed. I966). 
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determination that the first amendment would prevent any significant 
congressional regulation of speech and the press. The evidence tends 
also to make credible the claim that the objections to the Sedition Act 
of I798 were not feigned or contrived, but genuine and profound. 
None of this material, on the other hand, provides any support what- 
ever for the view that there was an acknowledged design to carry 
into the original Constitution, much less into the first amendment, a 
significant congressional power over the press. 
What in fact the evidence suggests most strongly is that the rela- 
tionship between seditious libel and the first amendment was not a 
"category one" kind of relationship at all. At the time of the debate 
about the first amendment, the principal issue to be settled was quite 
different. It was the federalism issue: not what speech was worth 
protecting, but rather who, as between Congress and the state gov- 
ernments, would have definitive power over that subject. It is because 
of the way in which that question was settled that the first amendment 
debate was such a desultory affair. If it were agreed (as it was agreed) 
that the states would have virtually exclusive power over the entire 
subject, it is less to be wondered that the scope of "the freedom" itself 
went substantially unattended. No clash of libertarian and antiliber- 
tarian views took place, because the framers' sole concern was to 
secure the subject from Congress. 
There was no speech or press crisis in I787 or I789 or I79I, when 
the first amendment was born. And as the "who" question appeared 
to be so congenially resolved, it is not odd that the answer to the 
"what" question was virtually subsumed in the answer to the "who" 
question: the freedom of the press would be whatever decentralized 
centers of power (the state governments) felt appropriate to allow, no 
matter what Congress might think, for it was Congress and its power, 
no one else's, that the amendment was designed to forestall. The 
scope of the first amendment must therefore be worked out in light 
of that understanding, rather than on the basis of some other view. 
Professor Levy acknowledges the importance of the federalism 
issue, but then takes a wrong turn in suggesting how it plays out. 
After insisting that "we should recognize that the Framers cared less 
about giving unqualified immunity to all speech than they cared for 
states' rights" (p. 268),21 Levy proceeds at once to suggest that the 
scope of speech the states generally valued under their own laws would 
exhaust the scope of speech they would likewise wish to keep from 
Congress. Thus, immediately following his statement on the federal- 
ism issue, he tends to dismiss that issue's significance in the following 
remark: "The big question persists, however; even had Congress 
21 It should be noted again, however, that the two did not need to be mutually exclusive; 
the framers were able to provide both for full states' rights and for unqualified immunity from 
Congress. 
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passed, and the states ratified, an amendment imposing upon the 
states the same prohibition laid by the First Amendment upon the 
national government, what did the Framers understand by freedom 
of speech and freedom of press?" (p. 268). But this inquiry serves 
only to muddle the issue by failing to recognize the distinction the 
framers drew between the powers of the states and the powers of 
Congress. 
The question is not (as Levy implies) what the framers would have 
understood by "freedom of speech and press" had they imposed "the 
same" restrictions on the states as they did impose on Congress. The 
framers were neither interested nor willing to limit the states' police 
powers by doing anything of the sort. Neither is the question how 
the framers would have defined freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press for the purpose of framing a separate amendment addressed 
only to the states, and not at all to Congress. Rather, the question is 
what they presumably meant to reserve for the states by denying to 
Congress a preemptive power to regulate differently, and that, one 
may suppose, would be virtually the entire field of speech, rather than 
simply soiae small, uncontroversial part of it. 
The consequence of this view, which Professor Levy's evidence 
strongly supports, is that it does not require evidence of some pre- 
vailing eighteenth-century libertarianism for a fair-minded historian 
to regard the first amendment as nonetheless a massive and deliberate 
denial of power in Congress over speech and press. The question that 
Leonard Levy states was "the big question" - namely, how much 
speech and press actually to protect - was deliberately left to each 
state largely to settle for itself without any preemptive authority in 
Congress to impose its own will. The foremost concern of the first 
amendment, indeed its sole concern, was to keep such determinations 
from Congress. 
In keeping with this understanding, it is conceivable that a few 
marginal measures might nonetheless be seen as sufferable for Con- 
gress to impose - for example, laws punishing acts of perjury in 
federal proceedings or laws forbidding false advertising in interstate 
trade - but assuredly nothing significantly beyond measures of such 
relatively trivial application or scope as these would represent. Any- 
thing more would seem entirely inconsistent with the basic thrust of 
the amendment, exactly as Madison had maintained. 
Accordingly, the federalism auspices of the first amendment pro- 
vided their own foundation for the "checking function"22 view of the 
amendment, notwithstanding the outrage of the Sedition Act of I798 
22 Cf. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, I977 AM. B. FOUND. RE- 
SEARCH J. 52I (discussing the function of the first amendment in checking the abuse of official 
power); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First 
Ainendmenit," I964 SuP. CT. REV. I9I (same). 
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and its administration (principally by Federalist judges). Nor does 
this view require any romanticized interpretation of the first amend- 
ment, but merely an interpretation by persons possessing an intelligent 
skepticism of centralized government. Such persons we know were 
abundant in I787, I789, and I79I, exactly as Levy's scholarship well 
concedes. May we not, then, treat the first amendment as the con- 
sequential by-product of their successful campaign and read it appro- 
priately as they proposed? I think a fair case can be made that we 
may - as indeed, somewhat despite himself, Leonard Levy has 
shown. 
III. FINAL IMPRESSIONS 
The subject to which Professor Levy has devoted himself has been 
one of enormous contention from I798 (the date of the Sedition Act) 
to the present, and Levy's painstaking review is among the best that 
can be found. Overall, it is exceptionally clear-eyed, comprehensive, 
and perceptive. Indeed, in my own view it is the single best critical 
history of the first amendment that has been written. Until one has 
grappled with what Levy has to say on this subject, one can scarcely 
claim to know the subject at all. Emergence of a Free Press is 
indispensable reading for the serious student of free speech in America. 
Of course, one might assert that books of this sort do not much 
matter except as a source of cultural interest - that the first amend- 
ment is what the judges say it is and that they are not bound (indeed, 
they seem scarcely inclined) to pay history any mind. Even if this 
assertion were wholly true, it would be no reason to forgo the expe- 
rience of this book, which speaks so well to its subject and merits 
one's interest entirely for its own sake. More important, however, it 
is gross error to suppose that history does not matter. Indeed, it 
matters greatly. 
Even granting the flexibility of constitutional construction, it is 
surely true that judges are human and will generally prefer to think 
that what they say is not a falsification of the document they are 
called upon to apply, but is at least in reasonably close keeping with 
its spirit. On this basis alone, history is scarcely avoidable. Unless 
one takes an interest in what the first amendment was meant to do, 
at least in a general way, one cannot know whether the interpretation 
one proposes to place upon the amendment comes reasonably close to 
the spirit of the thing. And once one does turn even a little in that 
direction that is, in the direction of this amendment, in this Con- 
stitution it is hard to lay aside one's inquiry until one feels one has 
indeed caught at least the essence of the thing itself.23 
23 For further discussion, see Van Alstvne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful 
Contribution of Special Theories of Juidicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (I983). 
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On the basis of Emergence, I think the essence of the first amend- 
ment was a resolve to cut Congress off from claims it might otherwise 
have made to regulate speech and press in America. The reason for 
this resolve may have had more to do with states' rights concerns 
than with libertarian concerns as such, but the end point was none- 
theless the same. If this conclusion is true, then the logical conse- 
quence is that the amendment should probably be applied even more 
tightly by the courts than it traditionally has been, rather than more 
loosely as some judges are now inclined to do. The history Levy sets 
out thus does suggest an appropriate modern-day interpretation of the 
first amendment. His work thereby enriches our understanding not 
only of what we have been, but also of what we may yet become. 
